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[The following editorial was released by the Council on Hemispheric Affairs on Nov. 1. It is
published with the permission of COHA.]
As Haitian military authorities maintain their silence over whether they will adopt the proposal
of the satellite pro-armed forces movement, the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti
made up of Tonton Macoute and other vigilante thugs that new elections be called to replace ousted
President Jean Bertrand Aristide, UN negotiator Dante Caputo insists that the Governors Island
Accord still lives and has arranged a new round of negotiations between the military and the proAristide Prime Minister.
In New York on Oct. 31, the UN Security Council issued an indecisive condemnation of Gen.
Cedras and his colleagues. Its reiteration that Haiti's de facto authorities must implement the July 3
Governors Island Accord, was a clear indication that UN diplomacy, at least for the time being, has
been stalemated if not bankrupted and must begin all over again on resolving the issue of political
legitimacy in the island nation. But this time, perhaps, the UN could do it with greater energy and a
more effective negotiator.
Three days before the Security Council's action, in a speech sadly reminiscent of the address given
before the League of Nations by Haile Selassie in the 1930s, ousted President Aristide called for the
UN to step up its efforts against the military regime by significantly tightening the embargo. But
even this modest request was not immediately honored. The regrettable truth is that up to this point,
UN diplomacy, represented by the efforts of former Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo, has
been grossly maladroit and entirely non-productive. His errors of commission and omission have
been so many, his judgement so inappropriate, and his loss of credibility so irreversible that the time
for him to be replaced is at hand.
For months, Caputo repeatedly has returned from Haiti telling the world that he had achieved
peace in our time, instead of admitting that the Haitian military is structurally wedded to power
because it has to protect its multi-hundred million dollar annual drug trafficking business and will
do everything necessary to stonewall over Aristide's return. His call for a new round of negotiations
on Oct. 31 and his insistence that the accord is still viable, is an indication of his flight from reality.
Caputo's latest opera bouffe action, which was wisely turned down by the former US president, was
to invite Jimmy Carter, among a number of other international personalities, to come to Haiti to
oversee the military's implementation of the New York accord, without even clearing this proposal
with other relevant parties.
Theatrics aside, Caputo still doesn't seem to realize that the reason the military threw out the
country's legally elected President two years ago was because, at the behest of the US embassy in
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Port-au-Prince and the Drug Enforcement Agency, Aristide had begun to crack down on those in
the armed forces considered servitors of the Colombian drug lords. For exactly the same reason, the
colonels will continue to view with abhorrence Aristide's return at this time because it would again
pose a mortal menace to their corrupt practices.
Islanders eagerly had awaited the UN's October 30 deadline for the restoration of their ousted
leader. Instead they got a multilateral naval blockade, which translated into a feel-good moment
for the international community, but more suffering for an already poverty-stricken population.
Symbolic of the rout of UN diplomacy, several weeks ago, rather than face down, at a critical
moment, the band of military-financed goons preventing 200 of its technicians from disembarking in
Port-au-Prince, their superiors ordered the US and Canadian personnel on a US naval vessel to beat
a hasty retreat.
There was no evidence that the White House or the CIA had anticipated such a possibility, or
considered stationing a stand-by force nearby. No matter how many denials it may make, with the
wimp factor now emerging, a deeply frustrated White House surely has ordered a military option
paper to be urgently prepared, providing for a possible Grenada-like lightening attack against
Haitian military facilities once the proper pretext, like endangered US nationals, is established.
The just-announced stationing of the US vessel near Port-au-Prince with 600 Marines aboard, and
President Clinton's call to pro-Aristide Prime Minister Malval not to resign, are evidence that the
Haiti situation is heating up. Who's to blame?
The White House is as culpable as Caputo, if not even more so, for doing nothing to improve the
incoherence of the Haitian policy that it inherited from the Bush administration. UN diplomacy was
looked upon as the proper vehicle for US Haitian policy, and, in fact, was a reflection of the goals
of the new administration. In this respect, Caputo was always little more than a message box for
Washington's general policy directives.
Even if, at this late date, the UN timetable for Haiti can be put back on track, and the military gives
up its present effrontery towards those trying to forge a constitutional solution to the island's
problems, it is unlikely that the highly limited objectives of the UN's misguided Haitian training
mission will ever be reached. The reason for this is that the terms of the Governors Island agreement
were based more on illusion than reality, and represented the vision of technocrats tinkering with a
problem, rather than a broad-gauged diplomacy intent on protecting an evolving international law
concerning the punishment of those who act extra-constitutionally.
In anyevent, skills learned from US and UN trainers inadvertently would most likely have aided the
Haitian military to more efficiently repress civilians. This proved to be the case in El Salvador, where
US-trained battalions turned out to be that country's armed forces' worst violators.

Will the Grenada option be exhumed?
To resolve the present Haitian crisis, the Clinton administration must expeditiously exercise one of
its limited options. It must resist the Grenada model, for, as events on that island have shown, it is
easier to destroy a polity than to recreate it. As for the present naval blockade, it is more symbolic
than functional, given the rampant smuggling which even now is booming along the border with
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the Dominican Republic, and would take too long to be effective and involve too much political risk,
considering the hardship it is now inflicting on ordinary Haitians.
Clearly, Aristide can never return to Haiti as long as the Haitian military, as it is now constituted,
remains. Washington must face up to the fact that it should have known all along that the Haitian
security forces cannot be reformed, they must be recreated. To do this, the UN's proposed presence
in Haiti has to be expanded and its mission redefined to include a peacekeeping role charged
with eliminating politically-motivated violence, while it disbands the military and forms a civilian
constabulary.
Without decisive action, Haiti's problems, including a prospective new wave of boat people heading
for Florida which Washington most fears could easily become the administration's premier policy
engagement and its Waterloo, if only because events are unfolding so close to home with such lethal
political implications, considering the damage that the Mariel boat lift did to president Carter's reelection campaign.
The Clinton administration inherited a bad situation and made it worse. Through the Reagan and
Bush administrations, scant attention was paid to Haiti, and the OAS performance was particularly
disgraceful because it barely took notice of the continual violations of human rights that were taking
place under Generals Namphy, Regals and Avril. The attitude it shared with Washington was that
it was only necessary to contain the problem, both within Haiti, and at the Krome facility in Florida,
where thousands of Haitian boat people were detained once they made it to US shores.

Warren Christopher's disappointing performance
Upon taking office, rather than laying out a clear plan that would have a chance of solving what was
admittedly a complex problem, the Clinton administration opted for more of the same. Reflecting
an extraordinary paucity of new ideas, the administration saved its capacity for creative foreign
policymaking for lavishing its attentions on Boris Yeltsin's purported commitment to democracy
and internal Russian politics, while erecting a whole series of ad hoc double standards elsewhere.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher's controversial contribution to forming a rational policy
toward the island was to call upon the man who authored the Bush administration's failed Haitian
strategy, Bernard Aronson, to temporarily stay on as Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Haitian
affairs.
Under Christopher, who clearly has been without a moral compass and who seemed never to
be able to comprehend what was happening in Haiti, US policymaking became a morass of
indecision alternating with last-minute damage control tactics. The other policymaking offices of the
administration, including the National Security Council, seemed equally incapable of coming up
with compelling ideas of how to arrange for Aristide to return to the island with his powers intact.
The problems affecting White House policy were long in gestation and reflected a remarkable series
of errors and false starts. At first, Washington backed an utterly porous OAS embargo that excluded
the one commodity that would have had some impact oil. Not for five months after it took office did
the Clinton administration go to the Security Council, where it easily obtained a resolution calling
for an oil embargo something that it could have achieved the first day. The administration then
proceeded to renege on threats to freeze US-based assets of pro-coup Haitians and cancel their
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multiple entry visas until months afterward, and not even, to this day, has it ever mentioned that the
Haitian military was awash in drug funds or that bribed Dominican officials were mocking the OAS/
UN embargoes two points that it should have placed at the center of the Haitian debate.

The missing link: the CIA's role
An ominous new element perhaps the missing link was added to the scenario when The New
York Times, in its Nov. 1 edition, claimed that key members of the Haitian military command
were on the CIA's payroll at least until 1991. This goes a long way toward confirming that perhaps
Washington's strange silence on the military's blatant drug connection much like its long tolerance
of Gen. Noriega's drug running in Panama was because it needed to preserve the armed forces
as a restraint on Aristide's populism. And while the CIA's alleged payoffs to elements of Haiti's
military leadership were reportedly modest, they were extremely important because they provided
the compromised Haitian command with legitimacy as well as immunity with US authorities.
For well over a decade, Panama's Gen. Noriega was on the CIA payroll because US authorities
valued the services he rendered to the US-sponsored contras in Nicaragua. Even though
Washington was well aware of and had extensively documented Noriega's major role as a drug
trafficker, it kept this information under wraps as it would jeopardize its covert relationship with the
strongman. The parallels with the CIA's just-disclosed relationship with Haiti's military thugs are
very frightening, and demand a full congressional inquiry to establish all of the details. The reported
connection also may account for the White House and State Department's strange public silence
over CIA analyst Brian Latell's disinformation campaign against Aristide. The other day, Latell, a
notorious CIA hardliner well known to Latin Americans for his arch-Conservative ideology, was
permitted to defame Aristide with two year-old, inaccurate and discredited charges relating to his
mental health and poor human rights record, aided by an entirely counterfeit document that Sen.
Jesse Helms (R-NC), leading the anti-Aristide defamation campaign, used to mount his slanderous
charges against the exiled Haitian leader. Rather than ordering CIA director James Woolsey to
reprimand Latell, the White House serenely distanced itself from them and almost appeared to use
these assaults against Aristide to weaken his resistance to its idea, which it soon dropped, that once
he returned to the island the Haitian President should broaden his cabinet by including some of his
most intractable adversaries in it.
And on the Hill, the alleged covert relationship may help to explain why Rep. Robert Torricelli
(D-NJ), who has defended the information the CIA garners through such channels, failed in
recent hearings to pursue the military-drugs connection at all, and neglected to mention that the
CIA reports defaming Aristide were almost surely influenced by that agency's relationship with
opponents of the ousted President. To carry out his inappropriate mission of salvaging rather
than eliminating the Haitian military, Caputo did what he knew best try to apply to Haiti the same
amnesty formula that his government granted the murderous Argentine military after it had killed
upwards of 15,000 helpless civilians during the so-called "dirty war."
With his crime-without-punishment approach, Caputo, who also is thought to have on his mind the
making of a run to replace the current OAS secretary general when the latter's term expires next
year, sold the American people a bill of goods that the Haitian military could be trusted. It is fair to
assess blame on him because he failed to educate the world about Haitian realities, and he made the
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problem worse by never mentioning the military's narcotics-related activities which, realistically,
would prevent a solution from being achieved. The White House was largely responsible for
Caputo's shortcomings, with its own flawed policy almost guaranteeing the failure of his mission.
Driven by an obsession that hordes of Haitian refugees must be prevented from reaching
Florida's shores, Clinton policymakers continued a disoriented strategy inherited from the Bush
administration, of looking upon the Haitian military as a countervailing and balancing force, and
part of the solution to any restoration of Aristide and with him, Haitian democracy.

What should Clinton do?
Instead of claiming victory where there is only defeat, and success when only failure has been the
dividend from its unfortunate Haiti policy, the administration must build a strategy based on fact,
not fiction. Haiti represents a major setback for US policymakers.
Clinton must restrain his sense of premature self-congratulation and leave it to other people to
applaud, if applause is deserved. Regarding Haiti, it certainly isn't. Nor will hurling rhetoric at the
problem solve it. The US President must take a leap of faith and for once believe in Aristide, rather
than trying to neutralize him by building up the Haitian armed forces through CIA support. Instead
of working so hard to praise Yeltsin as a confirmed democrat, when he may not be, Clinton might
look over to Aristide as a source of inspiration for his authentic democratic bona fides.

-- End --
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